This paper focuses on the overlap in the tax bases between two levels of government. This overlap leads to vertical fiscal externalities that arise when several different commodities are in the tax base and the tax bases of the two levels of government may not be identical. In the unified government's case, if it is supposed that the marginal utilities of income for the two states are the same, the tax policy in state i not only considers the price elasticity and cross elasticity of each state, but also the shares of expenditure on commodities x 1 and x 2 in the different states. When the cross elasticity is zero, the tax rates on the same commodity sold in the different states and the price elasticity should be inversely related. If the cross elasticity of the commodities is zero, the higher the marginal utility of income of state i, the lower should be the tax rate set by the unified government in state i.
Introduction
A federal structure of government involves at least two levels of government, a higher level as well as a set of lower level jurisdictions. Current federations composed of a national as well as a set of local governments allow both levels of government to exercise certain spending responsibilities, and both levels use taxation as one source of revenue. In a federation, fiscal externalities easily arise and distinctions can be made between tax and expenditure externalities as well as between direct horizontal and indirect horizontal and vertical externalities (Dahlby, 1996 [1] ). Within such a structure, the federal government has often been seen as having two fiscal roles: redistribution across the states of the federation and also the internalization of horizontal fiscal externalities. The federal government might achieve such internalization by coordinating the decisions made by the states, leaving the formal decision-making powers to the states, while it matches grants to deal with expenditure spillovers and so on (Keen, 1998 [2] ).
The literature on tax competition among governments for mobile tax bases has drawn attention to one of the most widely debated public finance issues 1 . Hoyt (2001) [5] points out that horizontal fiscal externalities have been a focus of numerous papers over the past 25 years. While increases in taxes on a mobile tax base in one jurisdiction will lead to a decrease in the tax base there, such increases in taxes will lead to an increase in the other jurisdiction's tax bases. The vertical tax externality arises when different levels of government simultaneously tax the same base. Vertical tax externalities act in both directions: federal taxes affect state revenues and state taxes affect federal revenues. Recently, the attention of researchers in the literature on vertical tax competition has been drawn to the analysis of fiscal externalities among different hierarchical layers of federations. Dahlby and Wilson (2003) [6] provide a model where a state government proposes a productivity-enhancing public input and both the state and the central government tax wages and profits to examine vertical fiscal externalities. Previous studies show that if consideration has been given to two levels of government imposing distortionary taxes on the same tax base, then a negative tax externality will arise.
In addition, the overlapping of tax bases gives rise to the public sector version of a new problem. A number of studies have, for instance, focused on the tax policies of two levels of government, namely, state and federal, with overlapping tax bases. Hoyt (2001) [5] provides two cases, one of which assumes that the federal and state governments have identical tax bases. In this case, both governments tax both commodities. The other case assumes that the state government has a limited tax base and can only tax one commodity while the federal government still taxes both commodities. While Hoyt's paper examines the tax policy within a hierarchical system of government and departs from previous studies in several ways, it is assumed that all states are identical 2 . To fully understand the implications of independent tax policies under heterogeneous states, our paper seeks to relax this simplifying assumption.
Besley and Rosen (1998) [7] were the first researchers to test empirically for the presence of vertical tax externalities, examining the case of unit taxes on gasoline and tobacco. However, they did not take into account the price differences across states that arise because high cost areas pay less in real terms than low cost areas, since federal unit sales taxes on cigarettes and gasoline do not differ across states. Consequently, Esteller-Moré and Rizzo (2011) [8] applied US data from 1975-2006 to propose that vertical tax competition can be estimated by using a federal tax variable that is expressed in real terms and thus shows cross-sectional variation across states. In their study, they test the impact of state taxes on gasoline and cigarettes of increases in federal excise taxes on these items, and provide evidence that an increase in the federal tax does not affect state tax rates in either case.
The purpose of this article is to provide new insights into the federal tax policies of heterogeneous states. We propose a theoretical model to explain how the federal government decides its tax policy when faced with vertical externalities in heterogeneous states. Our results can be related to recent results and proved through the empirical study of Esteller-Moré and Rizzo (2011) [8] . The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 consists of a brief model. In Section 3, we analyze the federal tax policy in the case of a unified government. In Section 4, we analyze the federal government's tax policy where each local government has a different tax base. Our conclusions are presented in Section 5.
The Model
The basic structure of the model is based on Hoyt (2001)'s [3] model. The federation we consider consists of two levels of government, a federal level and a state one, where each level of government has taxing and spending authority. In this case we focus on the overlap in the tax bases between the two levels of government. We assume that there is one input (labor) used in the production of the two consumption goods 1 i x and 2 i x in state . We also assume that both of the goods are normal. In addition, we assume that the states are heterogeneous in all relevant aspects. In each state , there are two publicly-provided goods or services. One of the public goods is uniformly provided throughout the country at the level G by the federal government. The other one is provided by the state to its residents, with
g being the level of service in state . The model is designed to keep the analysis simple. Thus, there is no horizontal fiscal externality among the state governments.
, 1,,n i i  One unit of labor produces one unit of any of the private goods or one unit per resident of either of the services. Given these production requirements, as in Hoyt (2001) [7] , pretax prices can be normalized to unity, or the price of a unit of labor. Let 
Federal Tax Policy in a Unified Government
The federal government is assumed to maximize the social welfare function and tax the entire tax base. Since all states are heterogeneous, it seems realistic to assume that the tax and expenditure policy chosen only by the unified government will maximize the social welfare function which will be of the Bergson-Samuelson type. If the unified government can set its tax rates on both commodities to those of state , and 1 i i f  and 2 i f  also set a unique level of public goods for each state i , the problem of the unified government becomes
2 Brülhart and Jametti (2006) [9] also derived a discriminating hypothesis to distinguish vertical and horizontal tax externalities based on measurable variables. Their paper found that vertical externalities dominate. Mandiès (2008) [10] found that some results related to whether equilibrium state taxes are likely to be too high or too low are much more complex when state-provided industrial public goods are considered.
The first-order conditions for (1) with respect to the tax rates and the level of public goods in state
where u denotes the maximum value function for the unified government.
L From Roy's identity
the marginal utility of income in state , i
where is the compensated demand for commodity and the symmetry of the Slutsky matrix yields
Rearranging terms enables us to express (3) as 
Let us assume
Tax on Commodities in the Same State
In the following case, the federal government can tax both commodities, 
where 1 
In the case of a unified government, the tax policy will depend on the magnitude of the compensated price elasticity of demand.
Taxes on Commodities in Different States
The unified government will choose its taxes given that the commodity is to be sold in different states. In this heterogeneous state case, the government should maximize the marginal social utility of public goods in all states as being equal. We can use (5) to obtain 
Assuming that the unified government treats the residents in different states alike, we will have
It is apparent that i  will be affected by 
Tax Policy in Federal and State Governments
In this section, there are governments at different levels, namely, federal and state governments. Each local government has a different tax base from that of the federal government, at least nominally. However, it is not easy to differentiate among the tax bases for these two levels of government and, as a result, the tax bases of the federal and state governments are overlapping. In other words, the tax policies of the federal and state governments will affect the decisions of the private sector and moreover the tax bases will overlap. In such a case, a vertical externality may result. Our analysis assumes that residents cannot purchase commodities among the different states. Thus, there is no tax competition among the state governments, and the horizontal externality may therefore be ignored.
Identical Tax Bases
Assume that the tax and expenditure policy chosen by the state government will maximize aggregated utility. If the state government can set tax rates on both commodities, 
denote the marginal rate of substitution between the state and federal public services. Rearranging the terms enables us to express as
If we impose symmetry on the compensated price elasticity of demand for good with respect to the price of good and the state government is assumed to maximize social welfare, then the excess burdens from taxing each commodity should be equal to each other. Taking 
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Expression ( x is less than it is on commodity 2 x for the state government. In addition, by taking (13) into consideration, the state optimal tax rates can be solved as 
In the case of identical tax bases, i.e., where the bases are overtaxed, the effect of the federal tax on the state tax as can be seen from (15a) In addition, where there are different hierarchical government levels, the federal government is assumed to maximize social welfare and only provides country-level public goods which are financed from taxes levied on 1 x and 2
x . The federal government's problem is
By making the same substitutions and process, we can have
Finally, dividing by  gives 
where
which implies the marginal rate of substitution between the public goods of state and the federal government 3 . i In this heterogeneous state case, the social-welfare maximizing federal government should consider both the economic efficiency and income distribution. Where the federal government taxes two commodities, 1 x and 2 x , in state , the marginal excess burden of the tax on good must be equal to that on good . 
Using (19a) and (19b), we can obtain 1 
As (20) suggests, if the compensated price elasticity of demand for 1 x with respect to its price in state is greater than it is for
, then the optimal set of tax rates for commodity 1 x is lower than it is for commodity 2 x for the federal government. In addition, we also can use (19a) and (19b) to solve for the optimal tax rates for the federal government as follows:
The federal government finances federal p lic goo s ub d and services from the entire base, while the state government only finances the local public goods and services by taxing commodity 1 x . Then the government of state i chooses its tax rates solve  Maximize , ,
.
The first-order conditions for (31)-(31b) with respect to the tax rates are
As should be apparent, given the identical structure of (24) in relation to the social-welfare maximizing rule, (23), solving (24) for the optimal tax rates of state government i gives The results obtained in this paper may be summarized as follows: 1) If the unified government maximizes social welfare, the tax rate selected for the commodity should be inversely related to the compensated price elasticity of demand for the goods on which the tax is levied within a state. When the cross price elasticity is zero, the state with low incomes should have a lower commodity tax rate; 2) In a multi-level government, when the state and federal tax bases are identical, the combined state and federal taxes should be inversely related to the compensated price elasticities of demand for the goods on which they are levied within a state. The federal tax rate must take into consideration the rate of social marginal substitution of the state public goods and federal public goods when the federal government decides the tax rates for identical commodities in different states. Table 1 summarizes the optimal tax rates for state i and the federal government for different tax bases.
